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n developing and transition countries, the public
institutions and administrations are weak. Public
utilities have not been successful in implementing
and maintaining sufficient water supply and sanita-
tion (W&S) services to the people (apart from some
positive exceptions).And without reliable W&S, the
socio-economic development in any country will be
disturbed.Thus, poor W&S are the reason as well as
the result of insufficient development.
This dreadful situation has not changed much during
the last decades, in spite of huge investment funds
financed by international and bilateral donors for
new public water utilities (Shikwati 2002). Since the
early 1990s, banks and donors have been discussing
and trying to involve private partners and private
investment for water and sanitation services in their
target regions.
Figure 1 shows the poor status of maintenance and
operations (M&O) of a supply water purification
plant in Latin America (chemical reaction chamber
full of sludge, even weeds growing!). For this utili-
ty, the donors decided to insist on private sector
participation (PSP) to secure M&O, which was
finally realised (after a long and complex process)
in 2005.
Water supply correlating with economic
development in Macao
Macao (China) is one of the well-researched cases
that demonstrates the interrelationship between
water services and economic development. Prior to
the closure of a water supply concession contract in
1985, water supply was of poor quality (high sali-
nity and turbidity) and unreliable (frequent fail-
ures, supply periods in some areas only a couple of
hours per day or not at all). Within three years of
the implementation of a new concession contract,
the water supply quality had nearly achieved EU-
standards. As Figure 2 illustrates,
the level of water supply services
(counted in number of connected
people) and the economic de-
velopment (GDP) are well-cor-
related. Although it is obvious
that GDP is dependent on ma-
ny factors, not only on the
level of W&S, noone can deny
that a lack of infrastructure, es-
pecially water supply and sani-
tation, would have prevented
this positive development in
Macao.
Figure 1
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Germany. Source: GTZ (1996).Sanitation and public health, the Durban example
Another well-documented case is Durban, South
Africa (Orth et al. 2005). Figure 3 shows a selected
supply area, the left part visualising the percentage
of appropriate sanitation delivered to the popula-
tion.The right part shows the number of incidents of
waterborne diseases (especially Cholera). Red fields
mark regions with no or poor sanitation,green fields
indicate high incidents with cholera.The correlation
is clear and needs no further explanation.
Beside severe economic costs of waterborne diseases
(preventing people from working, and causing sur-
plus expenses in hospitals and
the whole medical sector), the
huge social impact and human
tragedies linked to each individ-
ual fate should not be over-
looked.
The past 15 years of water PSPs
According to Prasad (2006),
there were only two private
W&S-investment projects in de-
veloping countries before 1987.
At that time, water privatisation
in France had a tradition of near-
ly 100 years, the UK had priva-
tised all public water associa-
tions two years before, and in
Germany a few dozen so-called
“Betreibermodelle” (BOOTs) had been realised
(the first in 1983, see Rudolph 2001).
The number of PSP-projects in developing and tran-
sition countries increased steadily year by year,
reaching its peak in 1999 with 38 projects. These
PSP-projects involve arrangements ranging from
simple service contracts, broad management assign-
ments (with no private capital requirements) and
lease contracts (affermage) with private working
capital to Greenfield Build-Operate-Transfers
(BOT), BOOT-contracts with significant private
investment requirements and full concessions gener-









































































































AN EXAMPLE OF THE LINK BETWEEN WATER SUPPLY QUALITY AND 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
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ating legal relations between water customers and
private water concession companies.
Due to various reasons (which will be described in
the next chapters), the number of PSP-projects has
decreased since its peak year 1999 (Figure 4). This
decrease occurred despite the fact that demands for
better solutions with regards to financing capacity
and management efficiency have not been fulfilled.
Recent developments
In 2003, only 11 PSP-projects were realised in the
developing and transition world.And until today fig-
ures have remained lower than in the peak years with
an estimated number of between five and ten
realised PSP projects (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005, plus
sources analysed by the authors).In 2005,investment
flows amounted to USD 1.5 billion, within the USD
1 to 2 billion range for the past
five years (excluding the USD
2.5 billion Syabas concession in
Malaysia in 2004, according to
Marine and Izaguirre 2006).
According to Prasad (2006),266
projects in developing countries
are currently in the “pipeline”,
of which 42 percent (111 pro-
jects) target a concession type
and less than one percent (20)
target full privatisation (dives-
titure).
Though under different working
conditions, the development of
PSP projects in Europe and especially in Germany
was somewhat similar, Figure 5 shows the number of
figures of PSP projects in the reference list of a
specialised consulting company (www.professor-
rudolph.de).The peak was caused by German reunifi-
cation and the large number of investments in new
water and sanitation facilities was needed to improve
the situation in the former German Democratic
Republic and Central East Europe (DEG 1999).
Especially the very rapid development of sanitation in
the former GDR was a unique experience, with
lessons learned for worldwide application in transition
and developing countries (UBA 2001).
Global players in the water PSP-sector
Since the development and procurement of PSP
projects in W&S is a complex issue, and sometimes
includes a long and democratic
procedure, it is not favourable
for small and medium-sized
companies without their own
lobbying network and large ad-
ministration (especially for le-
gal issues and other documenta-
tion). Hence, the number of
players in the PSP water and
sanitation sector has decreased
considerably.
The French professional water
service providers dominate the
world market. The global water
branches of VEOLIA (former
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WATER AND SANITATION PSP PROJECTS IN EUROPE
total number of projects
year of contract closure
Figure 5(former Lyonnaise des Eaux) supply approximately
54 percent of the water customers in the PSP world
market. Together with SAUR, French companies
cover 61 percent of the PSP global market. German
companies (including smaller PSP players not listed
in Figure 6) have a share of about four percent (after
the German power company RWE sold Thames
Water to a consortium led by the Australian
Macquarie). British private water service providers
account for 11 percent or approxiately 40 million
customers.
Depending on the type of PSP project, the region
and (very important) the clients’ procurement strat-
egy, there might still be viable competition. In any
case the global situation appears to be an oligopoly
led by the two giant French companies.
Global network and the factors working
against PSP
The decrease in numbers of annual PSP project
implementation is caused by the following factors:
1. In various countries,public bodies responsible for
W&S have realised that PSP may be a good solu-
tion to significantly raise efficiency (a pre-condi-
tion for financing), but that one important prob-
lem in the water sector will not be resolved by
PSP alone: cost-recovery has to be realised in a
transparent way, either through public subsidies
or water tariffs. On the other hand, private water
service companies have realised that they bear
more than just commercial risks (manageable
with skills and expertise). They had to learn that
politicians and public media
(with its populistic appeal) might
blame the private companies for
the water tariffs,even though the
costs would have been much
higher (and often for less value)
without privatisation. Therefore,
the clear definition and manage-
ment of political risks is essential
for PSP in W&S.
2. Public functionaries in water
utilities (and in this respect,
there is little difference between
developing countries and in-
dustrialised countries like Ger-
many) have recognised that wor-
king under a protected mono-
poly is much more comfortable than working in a
competitive environment. It is understandable
that they use their PR and lobbying power in
close relationships with their political sharehold-
ers (quite often they are the same people as the
functionaries and profit from the public monop-
oly). They tend to emphasise difficulties with
profit-oriented private companies, claiming that
public administration was always dedicated to
the welfare of the customer, with no self-interest
at all.
3. Global networks,like ATTAC and internationally
linked NGOs, like the BUND in Germany or
even members of religious institutions (like the
German Brot für die Welt) have strong doubts
about the power of competitive markets,and fight
against any form of PSP,favouring public monop-
olies instead. Some activists favour a non-PSP
option even in developing countries where it is
obvious that water shortage and insufficient sani-
tation will remain under public control.
However, one argument against PSP cannot be
denied: the complexity and the over-bureaucratic
approach of the donor-driven PSP tenders has fer-
tilised the global oligopoly illustrated in .Local com-
panies seem to have little or no chance to win PSP
contracts.
Failures
It is true that there have been failures in the history
of PSP in water and sanitation.But it is also true that
the reasons for these failures often lie outside the
PSP principle as such and are related to basic prob-
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GLOBAL PLAYERS
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lems which became noticeable in the course of a PSP
process:
• Cochabamba
From the beginning, a very ambitious and expen-
sive investment scheme was targeted for the prof-
it of construction companies linked to influential
politicians.The private company did not insist on
changing this scheme to a more efficient one (or
could not change the scheme against the will of
the client).The international donors concentrated
on legal issues, probably neglecting the essential
technical-economic environment. Local lobbyists
(among them private water vendors who would
have lost their profit once the public water supply
started working) in close collaboration with the
above-mentioned institutions and international
networks succeeded in organisinz public riots.
Fierce police reaction caused the tragic death of
six people. A realistic cost-calculation comparing
the status quo and the status ante with the status
post was not communicated in a transparent mat-
ter. If the public sector decides not to recover
costs through water tariffs (which may be under-
standable in developing countries), the share of
subsidies or revenues must be defined.
• Manila
Research carried out by the authors on behalf of
the World Bank revealed what experts had prob-
ably presumed. One of the two Manila PSPs was
successful from the beginning. The second failed
to overcome difficulties with definition, billing
and collection of water tariffs, due to various rea-
sons (including the Asia crisis).After re-tendering
and re-design, the project has recovered.
• La Paz
The private concessionaire improved the connec-
tion rates and water services to the poor as was
defined in the procurement contract, in compli-
ance with the contracted target. Nevertheless,
under changed political environment (elections),
the public client did not want to proceed, and the
private company finally gave up. In the beginning
the pressure groups seemed happy. At the
moment the situation (although money has been
provided by donors) is definitely worse than dur-
ing the PSP period.
• Daressalam
It is very difficult to obtain details and facts
describing what happened in this PSP. In the
beginning it was the international donor who
applied pressure to set up a PSP (fearing that the
public utility would not be able to operate water
facilities successfully, even if the investment was
granted). As experienced later, this suppressive
attitude led to difficulties. As soon as the grant
was ready for payment, the PSP was cancelled
using a variety of reasons and excuses. The man-
agers of the private company were arrested and
forced to leave the country.The public perceived
this activity as local patriotism against the “busi-
ness invader from outside”.
It is the experience of the authors that the full truth
about the PSPs in water and sanitation can only be
discovered by researching cases individually; inter-
net publications very often feature only one-sided,
subjective reports, as the following example shows:
• Nelspruit
One positive example is the W&S-concession in
Nelspruit, South Africa, which is among the most
often cited PSP “failures”. However, a case study
undertaken by the authors revealed that the situ-
ation has improved considerably, especially for
the poor. Even political difficulties (there were
never any significant technical difficulties) have
been resolved. Connection rates, performance
indicators and cost-recovery are much better than
for comparable municipalities in the region.As in
many other PSP cases, the reality is totally differ-
ent from the impression gained from information
in the Internet.
PSP results so far
The World Bank has recently tried to calculate the
number of connections installed by private
investors. Depending on the available data, the fig-
ures range between 250,000 and 600,000 new con-
nections in 15 years (Clarke 2004 ). Compared with
the more than one billion people without access to
safe water supplies (according to data from UN),
this figure seems rather low. But the outcome of
private sector investment in the water supply and
sanitation sector cannot solely be assessed by the
number of new connections installed. It is also
important to consider the improvements achieved
in the water (service) quality.
Overall, 84 percent of the more than 220 contracts
awarded for water utilities in 1990–2005 were stilloperated by 2005. About 16 percent of the projects
have failed (some of these would have also failed in
a market economy, not only because of political
pressure).Hence,the failure rate is not high (Marine
and Izaguirre 2006).
PSP in W&S – a complex issue
The overall positive results and the need for PSP in
W&S should not distract from the general difficulties
that are linked to the often complex structure of
long-term PSP contracts. The W&S sector is a deli-
cate system because of quality requirement and
hygienic risks.The social necessity of providing access
and (at least and basic) supply (e.g.in RSA:min.6 m3
per household and month) to the poor is another spe-
cific characteristic. These issues have to be solved
through a reasonable PSP design,taking into account
the natural monopoly of networks for W&S. In other
words, PSP in the water sector is more difficult (and
riskier in its planning and design because of the very
high portion of CAPEX or sunk costs) than in other
sectors like power and telecommunication, etc.
In Europe, most of the PSP procurement has been
characterised by transparent negotiation (publication
  pre-qualification   indicative offer   pre-selec-
tion of short-listed bidders   stage-wise exclusion of
bidders with proposals worse than others   last offer
from preferred bidders   final negotiations   con-
tract closure).But the (sometimes) negative effects of
focusing on legal, administrative and financial
instead of technical and efficiency-orientated issues
has led to the following statement:
PSP projects in W&S are
– seldom tendered as they were originally designed,
– seldom negotiated as they were tendered,
– seldom contracted as they were negotiated,
– and seldom executed as they were contracted.
Another general problem is the fact that the giant
global companies are “one-stop-shops”, providing
components, reconstruction services, various tech-
nologies, etc. This might (and in various cases, cer-
tainly did) lead to a conflict of interest between the
concession company, whose task is to carry out the
concession contract in loyalty to the municipality as
concessionaire, and the various departments within
the big “one-stop-shop”. Offering a low price in a
tender for operational services, these companies are
hoping for extra profit once they are in the position
to influence tenders for plant extensions,reconstruc-
tion, modernisation etc.
General conclusions
It is obvious that public utilities under the regime of
politicians are not able to improve the water and
sanitation services in many regions of developing
and transition countries. It is also obvious that so-
called “privatisation”is disliked by the public and by
the media and that this scepticism is supported by
political functionaries (according to their institution-
al and individual interests) and international net-
works (according to their general opinion about
market economies).
General difficulties with PSP, especially the large
projects driven by international donors, can be over-
come by 
– creating PSP procurements in a less bureaucratic
way and opening them for regional small and
medium-sized enterprises,
– using PSP models that leave legal ownership and
long-term governance with the public partner,
like management contracts or BOTs,
– ensuring that there is no conflict of interest
between operative functions and decisions on the
one hand, and trade and delivery of goods (like
spare parts,technologies) on the other,embedded
in the PSP (as this might happen with concessions
and very large one-stop-shop-companies),
-– making use of innovative new PSP-models,
encouraging SMEs in co-operation with interna-
tional professionals, as in a franchise scheme
(Asian Water 2006).
PSP will remain a difficult option in the water and san-
itation sector,more difficult than just collecting grants
from donors and operating the facilities without prop-
er cost-recovery. However, achieving the MDG (Mil-
lennium Development Goal,to which the internation-
al community is committed) and realising a sustain-
able solution will probably require more efficiency,
and in many cases a private partner with professional
management skills and some financing power.
The potential of PSP is usually understood as
– a driver of efficiency (institutionalised internali-
sation of performance incentives),
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– a source of financing (making projects bankable
and including private capital).
Further more, PSP is the door to the business devel-
opment of water services (not of water resources!),
which may be the major reason for conflicts between
those who want this to be a market economy, and
those who do not.
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